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sation than a solution. And, even if he is no better than a number of 
predecessors in this field at defining due process, Mashaw is an ex-
cellent conversationalist. 
As with due process, conclusions about Due Process in the Ad-
ministrative State lend themselves to metaphor. The book is per-
haps best analogized to a train ride. The route is at times difficult to 
discern. The scenery is interesting, lush, and varied; its order some-
times surprising. Veteran travellers will find much of the scenery 
familiar but also will note that many passing vistas appear in a new 
light. Although the journey covers considerable ground, no one 
will be bored on the trip. On disembarking, most will notice that 
they arrived back where they started. But everyone should feel cu-
riously refreshed and glad that they went. 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW. By Rogers M. Smith.t Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 1985. Pp. 1, 328. $22.50. 
Kirk Emmert 2 
The law, and particularly American constitutional law, is not 
self-contained. There are both practical and theoretical obstacles to 
confining the meaning of the Constitution to a strict reading of the 
words of the text supplemented, perhaps, by the clear intention of 
its framers. Our fundamental law points beyond itself, both down 
to the political forces and consensus that generate and support it, 
and up to the broader political and moral purposes to which it is 
finally instrumental. Constitutional law, understood as a mediator 
between regime purposes and principles and everyday political life, 
necessitates a Supreme Court that, as Tocqueville argued, is a politi-
cal as well as a legal institution. 
But if this view is more true to the nature of our constitutional 
law than the narrowly legalistic view, it too is problematic and 
raises a host of difficulties. How can we prevent infrequent, princi-
pled, and well-considered exercises in judicial statesmanship from 
giving way to frequent, unprincipled, and ill-considered fiats? Is 
there an understanding of the judicial task that promises to reduce 
instances of judicial imperialism by guiding and restraining judges 
as they move beyond the law to the broader purposes that it serves? 
Is an unelected Court, which is also a powerful political institution, 
I. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University. 
2. Professor of Political Science, Kenyon College. 
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compatible with American democratic principles and capable of 
sustaining support among a people who respect its decisions largely 
because they view it as a court of law? And finally, what, more 
precisely, are these broader ends that the Constitution serves and 
what are the philosophic or principled grounds for holding that 
they are the proper ends of our government, or of all governments? 
Is there a political and constitutional philosophy that can both de-
fend these principles and relate them to the provisions of our Con-
stitution? In his Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, 
Professor Rogers M. Smith focuses on this final concern, providing 
what he hopes will be a convincing "general theory of American 
liberal constitutionalism," a theory grounded on a reformulated 
view of the purposes of American liberalism. 
Professor Smith's work is informed by the view that liberal 
political theory and American constitutional practice are mutually 
illuminating to the point that neither can be properly understood 
without reflecting on the other. He warns political theorists that 
political ideas are "arid unless ... linked to their articulation in 
current forms of political life." And he admonishes legal thinkers 
that at the root of our constitutional controversies are unresolved 
problems inherent in modem liberal theory. We need, he thinks, a 
consensus about American liberalism, as a foundation for a "re-
newed constitutional consensus." 
The core of American liberalism can be found, in Smith's view, 
in the philosophy of John Locke. Not the overly tidy Locke of Pro-
fessor Louis Hartz, but a more obscure and problematic figure. 
Locke stressed limited government and the rule of law because he 
saw these as essential means to his ends of prosperity, civil peace, 
scientific progress, and rational liberty. The commitment to these 
goals moderates what some critics see as the excessive individualism 
of Locke, providing a public dimension to the pursuit of happiness. 
More important, Smith believes, is Locke's opinion that the "capac-
ity for rational self-determination is the distinctive feature of human 
nature and also the essential element of moral responsibility." Ac-
cording to Smith, this notion elevates liberalism by adding a moral 
dimension to its view of mankind's personal and political ends. The 
Lockean idea that mankind has a "special capacity for rational lib-
erty" is the core of Smith's effort to develop a theory of constitu-
tional liberalism. 
But if Locke is the source of our understanding of a sound lib-
eralism, why does Professor Smith need to elaborate his own the-
ory? Because, says Smith, Locke did not adequately justify his 
belief that attaining rational liberty is the proper goal of human be-
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ings and of the political community. Locke "advances principles 
that he claims are at once laws of nature, divinely sanctioned, and 
based on methodical reason. But the rational premises and methods 
employed by Locke do not seem to establish natural law and natu-
ral rights, or even to be compatible with them." Locke's psycho-
logical empiricism culminates in moral relativism, for all human 
beings do not in fact find pleasure in the same things, and particu-
larly not in rational self-determination. Yet Locke clearly also as-
serts that right or justice is grounded in nature and that some 
human pursuits are intrinsically more worthy than others. Smith 
concludes that Locke's relativism is incompatible with his belief 
that there is an objective human good. In addition, Locke fails to 
show, or even to try to show, that "morality can be a matter of 
rational demonstration, and that reason can reveal the law of 
nature." 
The major political consequence of this intellectual incoher-
ence of Lockean liberalism is confusion about the extent to which 
legitimate government is grounded on consent rather than on the 
attainment of certain ends such as rational liberty. This ambiguity 
is evident, Smith notes, in the Declaration of Independence, which 
argues that legitimate government must both protect certain natural 
rights and be based on the consent of the governed. 
Smith also discusses the alleged inadequacy of liberalism's 
goals, including its excessive stress on individualism. He distin-
guishes three basic views: a "civic" critique made in the name of 
civic virtue, community, and man's natural sociality; a "romantic" 
critique that stresses self-realization and the full development of in-
dividuality; and a "social equalitarian" critique made in behalf of 
equal treatment or, more radically, equal human worth. While he 
acknowledges that there is something to be said for each of these 
critiques, Smith basically rejects them as anti-liberal and incompat-
ible, therefore, with his effort to establish the theoretical foundation 
for a new liberal consensus. But although ultimately misguided, 
these critiques have undermined and pushed in new directions a 
classical liberalism made vulnerable by its inadequate theoretical 
foundations. 
What does all this have to do with American constitutional 
law? A great deal, in Smith's view, since "judicial decisions are in-
cidents of broader philosophical developments in American 
thought." Through a detailed discussion of four constitutional is-
sues--due process, free speech, legislative apportionment, and so-
cial and economic welfare-Smith seeks to show how unresolved or 
shifting resolutions to the problems of American liberalism have in-
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fluenced judicial efforts to develop clear and persuasive principles in 
these different areas. He discerns three broad, related develop-
ments. First, the continuing tension between the consent and 
higher law legitimations of liberalism, which is particularly appar-
ent "in the recurring debate between natural and positive law theo-
ries of the meaning of due process." Second, the tendency for a 
powerful liberal relativism to undermine the credibility of the 
higher law, a development that has led to "increasing judicial agree-
ment that consent is the basic justification for the legitimacy of the 
American constitutional system." (Thus recent court activism has 
been supported by appeals to evolving social values rather than to 
objective higher law or principles.) Finally, Smith notes that reser-
vations regarding original liberal ends, reservations that both arise 
from and contribute to liberal relativism, have led to "judicial at-
tempts to incorporate new sorts of values into the law, especially 
more romantic and egalitarian ideals." 
The main lesson that Smith draws from each of his four studies 
of constitutional issues is that sound, coherent constitutional doc-
trine awaits the reformulation of the purposes and grounds of 
American liberalism. Thus while the Court and leading commenta-
tors on due process assume that natural law standards have been 
superseded by "empiricism, consent, and democracy," they remain, 
despite their relativism, unwilling to accept any and every decision 
that might result from an open democratic process. This "lingering 
counter-majoritarianism" has, however, no solid, principled ground 
to stand on. Smith argues that we can move beyond our present 
patchwork, theoretically inadequate treatment of due process issues 
either by giving way to a majoritarianism that flows from an open 
democratic process-a position that few find totally acceptabl~r 
by addressing and resolving the philosophic problem of providing a 
convincing account of why some desires and interests are to be pre-
ferred to others. He finds in free speech cases a similar need to 
overcome confused and inadequate legal principles by elaborating a 
convincing case for advocating some values over others. And in the 
areas of apportionment and of economic rights and duties he con-
cludes that the law reflects confusions and uncertainties "about the 
proper purposes and foundations of a liberal constitutional regime" 
that can only be resolved by a fresh look at liberalism. 
Professor Smith believes that the solution is to adopt as our 
goal "liberalism's traditional concern to promote reflective self-
direction, or rational liberty." The rational liberty approach is con-
cerned with "the process of moral decision-making" and is particu-
larly concerned that conduct express "a process of rational 
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deliberation." It moves beyond process to a concern with substan-
tive standards in its "insistence that we must strive not to endanger 
anyone's capacities" for rational deliberation. The rational liberty 
approach focuses, then, on the process of deliberation rather than 
on substantive outcomes of that process. Its concern with substan-
tive outcomes is essentially negative in that it focuses on preventing 
those actions that inhibit rational deliberation in others or in society 
as a whole. 
But why rational liberty rather than self-preservation, prosper-
ity, self-expression or equal worth? Not, Smith makes clear, be-
cause reason can show that the pursuit of rational liberty is the 
proper activity of man and, therefore, the highest purpose of his 
political communities. The "rational liberty position," he asserts, 
"makes no claim to having discovered any ultimate truths about 
our essence or any natural moral order." How then does it avoid 
the very relativism that Smith has argued is the core problem of 
liberalism? Smith's reply is that 
because the rational liberty view takes its bearings ultimately from our personal 
experience of our selves as conscious, self-directing beings, it calls for us to judge 
what constitutes rational self-guidance not by any particular theory but by the no-
tions engendered by that experience, as perceived and expounded by the community 
at large. 
Not reason or nature but "our conscious personal experience" that 
we are capable of "rational deliberation and self-control" is the 
ground for holding that rational liberty is the proper goal of liber-
alism. To claims that human beings are incapable of free will, are 
fundamentally irrational, or ought to pursue other goals than rea-
son, Smith has two replies: that these positions are no more ration-
ally defensible than his and, more important, that "the common 
sense self-understanding of most people," as well as our experience, 
tells us that we are capable of rational liberty. 
Grounding rational liberty on our experience of rational con-
sciousness has important consequences for Smith's position on the 
question whether consent or objective, substantive ends legitimate a 
liberal regime. What constitutes rational liberty is determined, 
Smith contends, by notions engendered by our experience of ra-
tional consciousness "as perceived and expounded by the commu-
nity at large. Thus, political institutions should, through 
democratic processes, elicit and enforce prevailing social standards 
of what constitutes minimally rational, deliberative conduct and of 
what preserves the ability to engage in it." It appears that the prin-
ciple of rational liberty is given meaning and legitimated by the 
reigning perceptions of the community or by "prevailing social stan-
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dards," by what we might call the current collective consciousness 
of the community. Although he comes to it by a somewhat differ-
ent route, Smith seems to agree with the dominant current view, 
which he set out to modify, that consent legitimizes democracy. 
We can also discern within his legitimation of rational liberty 
glimmerings of the tension between consent and substantive ends 
that, he argues, is a sign of the inadequate theoretical foundation of 
current liberalism. What assurance is there that community con-
sent will endorse rational liberty as the proper end of our liberal 
Constitution or that it will have a sensible understanding of the 
meaning of rational liberty? Smith's view that the epistomological 
basis of rational liberty resides in our "common sense self-under-
standing" suggests that human beings are distinguished by their 
awareness of their existence as rational beings, that they have a nat-
ural consciousness of their rational nature. If this is the basic prem-
ise of his notion of rational liberty, then Smith's view of liberalism 
rests on an unacknowledged notion of man's natural essence and an 
unresolved tension between consent and objective ends. If Smith 
means to say only that human beings raised in the American politi-
cal and cultural tradition experience themselves as rational beings, 
then his position seems to be fundamentally indistinguishable from 
the "the democratic and relativistic" jurisprudence that he attrib-
utes to Alexander Bickel, a jurisprudence that upholds principles 
when they "represent the deeply held values of the American 
people." But his view may be more relativistic than Bickel's, for he 
notes at one point that the argument for rational liberty is "based 
on the fundamental characteristics of the human condition as we 
now experience it." Unless one has a good deal more optimism 
than seems warranted by political developments in our century, cur-
rent experience seems a fragile foundation on which to ground a 
new theory of liberal constitutionalism that holds that men are ra-
tional and aware of their rationality. 
Despite these difficulties, Professor Smith makes a convincing 
case that rational liberty would be a better principle, than, for in-
stance, current ideas of privacy or equalitarianism, to guide the 
Supreme Court's resolution of cases. As a principle to guide consti-
tutional adjudication, Smith argues that rational liberty has the 
merits of positive theory in that it is grounded in will or consent at 
the same time that it provides the suitable restraints on majoritarian 
choices characteristic of the higher law tradition. More generally, 
Smith contends that the rational liberty view occupies a moderate 
middle position between the moral vagueness of the neo-Kantian, 
equalitarianism of Rawls and the repressive and outdated moral ab-
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solutism of conservatives such as Walter Berns and John Courtney 
Murray. Holding that it is "wrong to destroy or injure the capaci-
ties for rational self-direction" of oneself or of others, the rational 
liberty view advances "a certain notion of morally worthy behavior 
that liberal societies are expected to enforce and promote." But this 
view also encourages tolerance and limited government, for its sup-
ports rational self-direction rather than substantive standards and 
holds that this goal is one that "each person must largely pursue on 
his own, within his preferred forms of association. It demands that 
each reflect for himself on his circumstances and decide on the 
course that will best aid in achieving both his continued self-gui-
dance and his distinctive happiness." But can this theory provide 
adequate restraints on the majority, and sufficient moral guidance 
for a liberal society? Smith's applications of the principle of ra-
tional liberty in the areas of criminal law, due process and free 
speech suggest that, while he would have arrived at his decision by a 
different route, he hardly ever disagrees with recent decisions of the 
Court. Concerning criminal law, he argues that rational liberty 
would support strong procedural guarantees while also stressing 
"the duty and benefits of self-control." It would thus be "less prone 
to be corrupted into a license for lawless behavior" than right-to-
privacy jurisprudence. In due process cases, rational liberty is again 
superior to privacy jurisprudence because it can provide "a more 
coherent, predictable, and principled reading of substantive due 
process requirements." And in free speech cases Smith argues that 
rational liberty provides some limits to preferred protection and 
thereby supports contemporary free speech doctrine: "[R]ational 
liberty goals imply that expression which is both non-cognitive in 
form and irrelevant or antithetical to rational deliberation in con-
tent is sufficiently distant from the First Amendment's purposes to 
merit only minimal scrutiny protection." In these three areas of the 
law, then, Smith makes a strong case that the rational liberty theory 
could support a moderate, balanced jurisprudence that provides 
broad scope to individual liberty while also supporting the commu-
nity's interest in rational deliberation, including the moral restraint 
necessary for that deliberation. 
But Professor Smith is less persuasive when he discusses legis-
lative apportionment and economic and social rights-issues that 
center on questions of equality. In these areas the rational liberty 
principle alone is not always able to support his conclusions: an 
additional principle is needed, in this case a view of equality that 
can stand on its own against the assault of radical equalitarians. 
Smith notes that "the rational liberty view assumes that the relative 
deprivation of economic goods need not endanger any basic liberty 
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interest." But since a strong case could be made that it does endan-
ger such liberty, to sustain his view Smith needs to address the issue 
of equality directly and develop and defend a view of it that is com-
patible with American liberal democracy as he understands it. If 
the principle of rational liberty is not itself sufficient to sustain a 
broad constitutional jurisprudence, we are led back to the question 
of the adequacy of Smith's reformulation of liberalism. 
Smith focuses on the objections to his views that come from the 
left-from the neo-Kantian equalitarians-and deals cursorily with 
the more conservative perspective of those who defend higher law. 
He makes some thoughtful and penetrating criticism of equalitari-
ans but dismisses too readily, particularly given the difficulties he 
has defending the grounds of rational liberty, the concerns of the 
defenders of higher law. Smith rejects the traditional view and its 
"absolutist orthodoxies" because it is no longer convincing to most 
people and so could not be the basis of a new constitutional consen-
sus; because it is impossible in any case to provide a convincing, 
rational account of the existence and content of higher law; and, 
finally, because he fears that its "moral absolutism appears equally 
capable of justifying self-righteous lawlessness and unlimited gov-
ernmental moral regulation." But the major difficulty with Smith's 
reconstituting of liberalism is that, in his desire to avoid moral abso-
lutes and to elaborate a position consonant with current opinion, he 
is left with a view that is not clearly distinguishable from the demo-
cratic relativism he seeks to avoid. A convincing case is yet to be 
made that the sort of decent, moderate liberal democracy favored 
by Professor Smith can be persuasively defended without reliance 
on higher law or natural right or a rationally defensible view of en-
during nature or essence. 
DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THE CONSTITU-
TION. By Martin Edelman.1 Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 1984. Pp. 399. Cloth, $39.50; paper, 
$16.95. 
Mark S. Pulliam 2 
Did the framers intend to embody a specific ideological or 
political theory in the Constitution, or did they enact an open-ended 
charter of evolving democratic principles? Professor Martin 
I. Professor of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany. 
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